IT’S a pity that national election, a festive occasion for the people of
Bangladesh, a civilised means for peaceful transfer of power, and a
vehicle for expression of popular sovereignty is being approached with
unqualified trepidation. At a time when there would have been expectancy
and excitement, anxiety and premonition rend the air. Why? All because
consensus on modalities of the election still remains a far cry and so
is the possibility of a well-participated credible election.
People are even expressing doubts whether an election would at all be held, and if held, what would it be like — tainted with poor turnout, one-sidedness and falling short of international standards? Or, an imposed one that because of lacking legitimacy will have to yield place to a new one held at double the public expense, not that for the first time, too. Only an incurable optimist will repose confidence in such an election.
When this is the perception in the final days of the incumbent government, how relevant is it to talk about the strengths and weaknesses of the Election Commission (EC)? I would say, it’s all the more reason why we must place the preparedness of the present EC under the microscope.
Representation of People’s Order (RPO) is the pivot of the electoral laws. The 2007 caretaker government carried out extensive reform of the RPO through an ordinance. This required candidates to furnish particulars on their track record including criminality, if any. Also, it tasked the grassroots committees in constituencies to create panels of nominees on the basis of which the central leadership will finalise the names of candidates. This provision aimed to curb nomination business, has been struck out of the RPO. It needs to be revived as a badge of intra-party democracy.
In material terms, the Election Commission’s proposals to amend 41 articles in the RPO were overlooked in preference to law ministry’s recommendations to amend 28 articles. These, placed before the cabinet in a bill form for approval, include raising of the election campaign spending ceiling and debarring ‘independent-rebel’ candidates from elections. This impinges on the democratic right of citizens to contest election. Thankfully though, in the face of public outcry, the Commission has retracted from its abdication of the authority to cancel candidature of persons found guilty of misconduct.
For electoral offences, the punitive clauses have been watered down and the Election Commission’s request for transfer of a government official may not be obligatory for the authority to comply with. The law ministry has also not endorsed the Commission’s proposals for authority on auditing electoral expenditure and processing action against candidates concealing information or otherwise liable for infringement of RPO regulations.
It will be worthwhile to take a cue from how the EC is structured and how it functions in the established democracy of India as compared with the EC in a relatively nascent and troubled democracy such as in Bangladesh.
Our EC is five-member body with a CEC and four Commissioners. Indian Election Commission is a three-member body with a CEC and two Commissioners. The vastness of India makes the election the largest single event management in the world for which the credit goes to the compact three-member Commission. In a country of 800 million voters, 350 general assembly elections are held to 36 states in addition to the national elections. The Commission works with 650 chief electoral officers at the district level drawn from the IAS cadre on contract for three years. They are such a mosaic of diverse origins that a certain neutrality is built into the structure.
In Bangladesh, the EC has 3,500 staff members of different grades; Operatively, returning officers and assistant returning officers drawn from the executive cadre are the lynchpins in the system.
In India, a system of total compliance with the model code of conduct prescribed by the EC is a fact of life because political parties, candidates, constituencies and voters fully cooperate with the EC in the electoral endeavour.
The electoral infrastructure has complements in committees of accountability, and moral certification and monitoring committees that address the concerns centering around election expenditure, use of money and muscle power, ‘paid news,’ use of communal language in campaigns among a whole lot of predilections a general election may fall prey to.
Remember that in a historic verdict of the Indian Supreme Court ‘no-vote’ by way of rejecting a candidate has been recognised as a citizen’s right to free expression among his/her fundamental rights.
In the context of Bangladesh, such an option could add value to the right of franchise which political parties lay a unilateral claim to.
People are even expressing doubts whether an election would at all be held, and if held, what would it be like — tainted with poor turnout, one-sidedness and falling short of international standards? Or, an imposed one that because of lacking legitimacy will have to yield place to a new one held at double the public expense, not that for the first time, too. Only an incurable optimist will repose confidence in such an election.
When this is the perception in the final days of the incumbent government, how relevant is it to talk about the strengths and weaknesses of the Election Commission (EC)? I would say, it’s all the more reason why we must place the preparedness of the present EC under the microscope.
Representation of People’s Order (RPO) is the pivot of the electoral laws. The 2007 caretaker government carried out extensive reform of the RPO through an ordinance. This required candidates to furnish particulars on their track record including criminality, if any. Also, it tasked the grassroots committees in constituencies to create panels of nominees on the basis of which the central leadership will finalise the names of candidates. This provision aimed to curb nomination business, has been struck out of the RPO. It needs to be revived as a badge of intra-party democracy.
In material terms, the Election Commission’s proposals to amend 41 articles in the RPO were overlooked in preference to law ministry’s recommendations to amend 28 articles. These, placed before the cabinet in a bill form for approval, include raising of the election campaign spending ceiling and debarring ‘independent-rebel’ candidates from elections. This impinges on the democratic right of citizens to contest election. Thankfully though, in the face of public outcry, the Commission has retracted from its abdication of the authority to cancel candidature of persons found guilty of misconduct.
For electoral offences, the punitive clauses have been watered down and the Election Commission’s request for transfer of a government official may not be obligatory for the authority to comply with. The law ministry has also not endorsed the Commission’s proposals for authority on auditing electoral expenditure and processing action against candidates concealing information or otherwise liable for infringement of RPO regulations.
It will be worthwhile to take a cue from how the EC is structured and how it functions in the established democracy of India as compared with the EC in a relatively nascent and troubled democracy such as in Bangladesh.
Our EC is five-member body with a CEC and four Commissioners. Indian Election Commission is a three-member body with a CEC and two Commissioners. The vastness of India makes the election the largest single event management in the world for which the credit goes to the compact three-member Commission. In a country of 800 million voters, 350 general assembly elections are held to 36 states in addition to the national elections. The Commission works with 650 chief electoral officers at the district level drawn from the IAS cadre on contract for three years. They are such a mosaic of diverse origins that a certain neutrality is built into the structure.
In Bangladesh, the EC has 3,500 staff members of different grades; Operatively, returning officers and assistant returning officers drawn from the executive cadre are the lynchpins in the system.
In India, a system of total compliance with the model code of conduct prescribed by the EC is a fact of life because political parties, candidates, constituencies and voters fully cooperate with the EC in the electoral endeavour.
The electoral infrastructure has complements in committees of accountability, and moral certification and monitoring committees that address the concerns centering around election expenditure, use of money and muscle power, ‘paid news,’ use of communal language in campaigns among a whole lot of predilections a general election may fall prey to.
Remember that in a historic verdict of the Indian Supreme Court ‘no-vote’ by way of rejecting a candidate has been recognised as a citizen’s right to free expression among his/her fundamental rights.
In the context of Bangladesh, such an option could add value to the right of franchise which political parties lay a unilateral claim to.
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